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The Decisions of the Court of Appeals
in Recent Years and How They Have
Affected Substantive Law*
WILLIAM

S. ANDRmwst

No more delicate task comes to an Appellate Judge than the
adjustment of the law of the past to the social needs of today. "All
law is a compromise between the past and the present, between
tradition and convenience."' The efforts of the Court of Appeals
during the last years to effect this compromise, to determine in each
case what weight to give to stability-what weight to growth and
progress-that is the subject of my discussion. For sometimes
unconsciously, such a balance holds the final factor in many decisions.
Stability and change are both essential. These opposites must be
reconciled. How well the reconciliation has been effected we lawyers
of today can not say. In this spot, more might have been done.
There, too much. The experiment can proceed only by the method
of trial and error. No man may predict success in advance. We can
but bear in mind that the attempt must be made. Therefore, this
is to be no criticism, but a history. I speak purely for myself. As
Judge Pound stated lately in an article in the Harvard Law Review,
"The suggestions are presented, not ex cathedra, but as one lawyer
speaking to others on a controverted question, in order to widen the
discussion, not to end it. Chancellor Kent said of his 'Battery
Opinions' 'They cost nothing and bind no one'."2
Even if criticism were possible, a critic could influence our profession merely here and there. With the facts before them all men
will not reach the same conclusion. There must be stability in the
law. There must be-growth. Yet where stability or where growth
is the more important, this is the point of division. Some, attached
to the past, will mourn every departure from the common law. They
*Address before Bar Association of the City of New York, March 24, 1927.
tjudge of Court of Appeals of the State of New York.
'BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE (igo) 607.
TPound, The JudicialPower (1922) 35 HARV. L. REv. 787.
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may not completely agree with Mr. Justice Blackstone in the well
known case of Perrinv. Blake. "Whatever their parentage," he says,
speaking of certain technical rules, "they are now adopted by the
common law of England, incorporated into its body, and so interwoven
with its policy that no court of justice in this Kingdom has either
the power or (I trust) the inclination to disturb them." 3 Even
conservatives of today are not all ready to go to such a length. They
may better agree with the modified view of that distinguished lawyer,
Judge Dillon-some of us may remember him lecturing in the old
Columbia Law School on Great Jones Street. Judge Dillon said,
back in 1864: "We have conducted our examination of this question,
fully impressed with the conviction that it is dangerous to innovate,
although it must be admitted to be sometimes necessary to do so,
and are gratified in the belief that the conclusion we have reached
neither involves the introduction into the law of evidence of any new
' 4
principle nor the subverting of any old ones.
But, these conservatives say, the precedents contained in the
reports, although they now amount, as Mr. Justice Stone has pointed
out, to about 18,500 volumes and increase each year by about 350
more,5 and the logical deductions to be gathered from them, are to
guide the courts to a correct decision in every case. Here and there
injustice may result, but certainty is the main consideration.
Other men, seeing the needs of our expanding life, impressed with
the new relationships caused by modem civilization and modem
business minimize the applicability of ancient customs. They quote
Bryce. Courts are not to be blind "to the truth that the first business
of law is to subserve the well being of the people and to win their
confidence as well as command their obedience." 6 They quote
our late great Chief Judge. "The administration of the law is a
practical matter.... Where possible it must with reasonable flexibility adjust itself to new and changing conditions and in accordance
with recognized principles must attempt to solve the problems of life
in a well ordered, fair and reasonable way which will secure the
approval of well informed and intelligent opinion.'17 There is, they
add, a considerable percentage of rl-decided cases. Even many
of those that represented the law of the day, no longer should be
held to bind us. Certainty is of less importance, if courts are to
3i
4

HARGRAVE, LAW TRACTs 489, 498 (1772).

County v. Ingalls, I6 Iowa 8I, 85 (1864).
'Stone,
Law Simplification (1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 319.
6
7Supra note i, at 635.

Hiscock, Progressivenessof New York Law (1924) 9 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
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RECENT DECISIONS COURT OF APPEALS
retain public confidence, than decisions in each .particular case,
which do justice then and there. Not only do they call for statutory
change, but they ask the courts to abandon ancient landmarks to
reach that result.
There is a basis for each view. The truth may lie between the two
extremes.
Pragmatism is often an answer to our troubles. Not
a philosophical theory, complete and logical and flawless. Not a
rule hedged about with exceptions meaningless today. Some compromise that on the whole works well.
Many of you are familiar with the lectures of Chief Judge Cardozo
at Yale University where he speaks of the two tendencies. We must
have certainty that the individual may so regulate his life as to keep
within the bounds of law; that the lawyer may give advice with
assurance; that the judge may be guided to his decisions. So we
appeal to precedents, and draw logical deductions from them which
we apply to modem conditions. Or when the precedents are too
numerous, we crystalize them into Codes and again start on a new
series of decisions which in turn become precedents for the future.
Thus is certainty preserved. But a changeless law is a sign of decay.
It is not the law of the Medes and Persians "which altereth not"
that marks a growing civilization. New situations continually arise,
to which old principles fit badly or not at all; to which logical inferences from these principles cause absurd results. The legislature
may act. Usually it does not. Then what are the courts to do?
Are they to follow old paths? Are they to cut new trails? Certainty
or growth? When and where and how?
No man, I think, may give an answer always applicable. A generalization of Dean Pound gives slight aid. Some branches of the law,
as inheritance, real estate and commercial contracts, call for the
greater stability.
Rules as to torts permit of change with greater
freedom. Still we are carried but a short way. A particular case is
to be decided. What theory is to govern?
Here is ground for the statesman-perhaps for the prophetrather than for the judge. It is the most serious question that confronts an appellate court. As statesmen differ in their views of
governmental problems, so will judges in the results reached by them.
How and when certainty should be abandoned will depend upon
their conception of the needs and ends of the law.
The praetor with his edicts, until they too hardened into rules,
was free to follow his ideas of natural justice. The chancellors, until
they too became bound by precedent, might correct by their injunctions abuses caused by the letter of the common law. No such wide
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latitude is allowed a modem judge. Still he has some freedom.
He may and must balance the two opposing necessities.
If change is to come, the how is comparatively unimportant.
It may be made by distinctions without reality. It may be announced
frankly. The when, is the important point. Most of us will agree
that it is for the wise judge to see that it is not unnecessary; that it
is not too radical for the needs of the day; that it will, so far as foresight can determine, promote honest conduct without too great
disturbance of present rules; that it will as little as possible affect
existing rights. These after all are mere words. Their importance
lies in the interpretation to be given to them. As well say, "As
growth must needs come, change should be made when it is advisable."
Whether thought advisable or not depends upon the mental attitude
of the appellate court. This will show even in the interpretation of
statutes. The Court of Appeals is told on criminal appeals "to give
judgment without regard to technical errors or defects or to exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties."
To one this means as slight a departure from old rules as the language
will permit. The wrongful admission or exclusion of a material bit
of evidence he says affects the substantial rights of the accused.
To another, if the defendant seems in fact guilty, it does not. Only
where his guilt is really doubtful, and if the evidence is so important
that it would probably alter the verdict of the jury should there be
a reversal.
So the practicing lawyer is in a dilemma. Is his case one where
precedent will prevail, or one where change will come? No man can
say with certainty. Ordinarily he is safe in reliance on his precedents.
But it may not be so. His judgment and common sense must guide
him as, let him hope, they will guide the judges of the appellate court.
As briefly as possible I intend to refer to decisions of the Court of
Appeals made in the last ten years or so. Many of the cases, while
novel questions may have been presented on the facts, do not show
conscious alteration of old rules, or the conscious refusal to make
alterations. Yet they may indicate the tendency of that court.
Some are cases where clanges have been made or new principles have
been announced modifying what theretofore was considered the
substantive law or the law of evidence. And there are others, where
change was urged, where it might have been made, but where it was
denied as inconvenient, or as too deeply touching existing rights.
I begin with the latter.
As we all know, a private seal has lost much of its ancient im8C. C. P. § 542.
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portance. No longer is an impression on wax required, although still
there must be some mark or the like affixed to the signatures to make
the document a sealed instrument. 9 With the passing of the older
formalities it was said that the older rules as to the peculiar effects
of sealed instruments should be also ignored. Indeed much encouragement had been given by the Court of Appeals to such a claim. In
Harris v. Shorall,'0 it was intimated that the rule that a sealed instrument might not be modified by a parol unexecuted contract had
no longer practical reason for its support. Then came, however, two
cases where the force and effect to be given to a seal was directly
involved." In them the court was required to consider the result of
a change upon existing rights. In the first, it was held that a contract
under seal might not be enforced against undisclosed principals.
In the second, that such a contract so far as unexecuted might be
modified only by a contract itself under seal. The answer to the
criticisms of these decisions is that there are many instruments made
in reliance upon the present rules. Sealed agreements as to real
estate are executed expressly to protect undisclosed principals. If
change be wise, it should come from the legislature which may make
it prospective only, not from the courts which can not.
A corporation as we all know, is a legal entity, wholly distinct
from its stockholders. For its acts and defaults it and not they are
liable. It has been argued, however, that where one person owns
substantially all the stock and is in complete control he should be
responsible for its torts. To permit him to escape is the evasion of
justice because of a mere legal fiction. Again, however, the Court
of Appeals has not yielded to these arguments.12 It has thought that
in spite of injustice here and there, public policy is better served,
oil the whole, by preserving the old distinction.
Again, it has refused to change the rules as to champerty when
land held adversely is conveyed," and also the so-called "residue of
a residue" rule.' 4 Perhaps in both these cases the abandonment of
precedent would have caused no particular harm. In the second
case, the court said that the reason given for the rule was not very
apparent, satisfactory or convincing. In the first, the court was told
by a professor whose pet theories seem to have been ignored that
9

Empire Trust Co. v. Heinze, 242 N. Y. 475, 152 N. E. 266 (1926).
N. E. 572 (1921).
1023o N. Y. 343, i3

"Crowley v. Lewis, 239 N. Y. 264,146 N. E. 374 (1925); Cammack v. Slattery,
N. Y. 39, 148 N. E. 781 (1925).
22Elenkrieg v. Seibrecht, 238 N. Y. 254, 144 N. E. 5i9 (1924); Berkey v. RailCo., 244 N. Y. 84, 355 N. E. 58 (1926).
way
13
People v. Ladew, 237 N. Y. 43, 143 N. E. 238 (1924).
14
Wright v. Wright, 225 N. Y. 329, 322 N. E. 213 (1939).
243
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"it would be difficult to find in reported cases a clearer illustration
of the importance of equipping lawyers and judges with adequate
analytical tools with which to work. For want of such an equipment
the majority of the Court of Appeals" (six out of seven) "seem to
the present writer to have reached a decision in an important case
by means of an argument which can not stand the test of careful
analysis and one for which, in the light of the policy established by
5
Unable to
past decisions it is difficult to see any justification."'
appeal he seems to have chosen the second alternative said to be
open to defeated suitors. As for the court, it may pray with King
David, "Let the righteous rather smite me friendly and reprove me;
but let not thieir precious balms break my head." Apparently it was
thought that certainty with regard to wills and real estate was more
important than logical consistency. Perhaps too, there was the more
reluctance to abandon established precedents, as in each case justice
seemed to lie with the successful party.
Two more examples, this time in respect to torts. One who
negligently causes a fire has been held responsible only for damages
16
suffered by property adjoining that on which the fire started. I see
no real basis for such a rule. It was a matter of practical expediency.
Yet notwithstanding sharp criticism, when the court was asked to
review its previous decision, while it did say it was not to be extended,' 7 it refused to make the alteration suggested. 18
A more interesting case has to do with negligent injuries done to
an unborn child. The courts have usually refused to permit a recovery in such cases on the theory that the child was not a separate
person at the time, although this is not true as to property rights.
Nor as to some crimes. If one injures a child before birth so that he
dies thereafter it may be manslaughter. The Court of Appeals
followed the existing rule, largely on grounds of policy. 9 Possibly
it had also in mind the difficulty of tracing in such cases the relation
between effect and cause. The result so reached may be compared
with another case where an equally long line of decisions was overruled and relief afforded. At common law, a wife might not bring
an action for criminal conversation against the paramour of her
husband. The reasons, the court said, were archaic. Modern
conditions and modern legislation rendered them no longer applicable.
11(1925)

34 YALE L. J. 409.

16
Hoffman v. King, 16o N. Y. 618, 55 N. E. 401 (1899).
l7Davies v. R. R. 215 N. Y. i81, xo9 N. E. 95 (1915).
8
N. Y. 568, 142 N. E. 287 (1923); Moore

1 Rose v. R. R. 236
673, 148 N. E. 753 (1925).
lgDrobner v. Peters, 232 N. Y.

220,

v. Co., 24o N. Y.

133 N. B. 567 (i 9 2 1).
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"The common law is not rigid and inflexible, a thing dead to all
surrounding and changing conditions; it does expand with reason.
The common law is not a compendium of mechanical rules written
in fixed and indelible characters but a living organism which grows
and moves in response to the larger and fuller development of the
nation.... Courts exist for the purpose of ameliorating the harshness
of ancient laws inconsistent with modem progress when it can be
done without interfering with vested rights." 20
In turning to cases where changes have been made or which involve
decisions under a novel state of facts, our attention is at once called
to the wide extension of the so-called police power-"a dynamic
agency, vague and undefined in its scope, which takes private property
or limits its use when great public needs require, uncontrolled by the
constitutional requirements of due process." 2'
"It extends to so
dealing with conditions which exist as to bring out of them the
greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or
general prosperity."22 The court had gone far before the ten years
to which we are now limiting the discussion. It has gone farther since.
In earlier years, it was a concept that a man might do as he
would with his own, except insofar as he offended what was then
considered some legal right of his neighbor. So as to his right
to contract freely. The State might not interfere. True, this was not
universally so. Upon making due compensation, it might take
property which was required for public use. But generally it might
not limit the owner's use of his property. Nor might it interfere
with freedom of contract or the right of the citizen to engage in
business how and when and where he chose. Although some limitation was admitted to be necessary, little emphasis was placed upon
the actual conditions of today. One of the earlier indications of a
different view came as to a business said to be affected with a public
interest. But the courts adhered with much strictness to the older
doctrine.
In Ives v.So. Buffalo R. R. Co.,2 for instance, the Workmen's
Compensation Act was held unconstitutional as depriving the
manufacturer of his property without due process of law. In People v.
Williams, it was said that the State might not prohibit a contract
with a woman for employment in a factory during certain hours.
In People v. Marx0 it was decided the State might not prohibit the
2
1Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N. Y. 156, 164, 14o N. E. 227 (1923).
2t
People v. La Petra, 23o N. Y. 429, 430, 130 N. E. 6O (1921).
"Matter of Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N. Y. 288, 298, i5o N. E. 120 (1925).
"2oI N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431 (I9II).
2I89
299

N. Y. 131, 81 N. E. 778 (1907).

N. Y. 377, 2 N. E. 29 (1885).
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manufacture and sale of oleomargarine. These cases are but illustrations of the limited power conceded to the State to interfere with the
affairs of its citizens. Property, contracts, business-no meddling
with either. I do not suggest that they were mistakenly decided.
The opinions were rendered by able judges giving their considerate
conclusions. They spoke the philosophy of the day. Even though
under the somewhat vague theory of the police power much was then
allowed, no such wide extension was given to it as now. All change
is not progress, if by progress we mean an alteration for the better.
But for good or ill the change has come. We are on the open sea.
The old landmarks have sunk below the horizon. We have some
charts to guide us, but we must depend largely upon the skill and
judgment of the captain.
I for one do not lament the past. Mere rigidity means death,
not life. As always, law must express the needs and the desires and
the theories of the community. It can not by formulas check the
changing philosophy of the people as to its government. To this it
must conform, perhaps slowly, perhaps with hesitation-but conform
if it will live. The philosophy may be unwise-the wisdom of our
fathers 'may be greater than our own. I do not pretend to know.
Wise or foolish it is going to control. All the courts may do is to
follow these changes-acting as a check, perhaps, but yielding in
the end.
So it is that a review of recent decisions indicates that the court
has of late continually expanded the scope of permissible governmental interference with what were once thought almost sacred rights.
I do not need to speak of these cases in detail. That has been done
many times. As to property-the rent laws have been held constitutional.28 The zoning laws as well ;27 and also provisions of the
tenement house law.28 So the State may release and protect beaver
29
without liability to those whose property is thereby damaged.
Generally it is said "the State may establish regulations reasonably
necessary to secure the general welfare of the community by the
exercise of its police power although the rights of private property
are curtailed and freedom of contract is abridged."'"
Business and freedom to contract have been limited by laws
providing as to night work for women; 31 as to the sale of theatre
26

People ex rel. Dunham v. La Fetra, supra note 21, at 429.
Trust Co. v. Williams Co., 229 N. Y. 313, 128 N. E. 209 (1920).
2Altz
v. Leiberson, 233 N. Y. I6, 134 N. E. 703 (1922).
29Barrett v. The People, 22o N. Y. 423, 116 N. E. 99 (I917).
3OPeople ex rel. Dunham v. La Fetra, supra note 21.
3People v. Schweinler Press, 214 N. Y. 395, io8 N. E. 639 (x915).
27
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tickets," although here the court may have gone too far; as to .the
sale of patent medicines;3 or of jewelry at night.4 These and many
other like provisions have met with the approval of the court. The
State may regulate secret societies,35 and it may enact what we know
as blue sky laws.3" In fact, it is difficult to fix a limit that some day
may not be overpassed. Now, however, it is safe to say that at least
the courts will not tolerate what amounts to total confiscation of
private property. Nor may the legislature now prohibit a lawful
common and ordinary business, however far it may regulate its
practice. 37 No one can go much farther. Still less may one predict
the future. "The needs of successive generations", said Chief Judge
8
Cardozo, in Klein v. Maravelas,1
"may make restrictions imperative
today which were vain and capricious to the vision of times past."
So I leave this subject, as indeed it must be left, with no attempt
to define the limits of the police power now-much less to predict
what they may be in ten or fifty years, yet with the confident hope
that the courts will effect a wise reconciliation between the reasonable
rights of the individual and the public necessity.
The war and its results have raised questions new to our state
courts. What are they to say of the unrecognized Soviet government
of Russia, for instance? May that government be sued or may it
sue here? It may not be sued. That is clear. The goods of an
American citizen stored in Russia are confiscated without right, by
mere force. Was this a conversion? Was the Soviet, admitted
to be a de facto government, to be treated as an ordinary foreign
corporation? The court held this might not be done. Within its own
territory the Soviet was a sovereign power.
Non-recognition did
not alter this undoubted fact. And as a sovereign it might not be
sued in our courts without its own consent. The question of redress,
if redress there is to be, is a political one. It must rest with the State
Department. 9 Again, a similar action was brought against one of
the ephemeral revolutionary governments controlling for a time
a portion of Siberia. If in truth a de facto government, it might not
be sued. If not, if it might be considered merely a corporation,
when armed forces conquered its territory and extinguished its powers
32

1People v. Weller, 237 N. Y. 316, 143 N. E.
nFougera v. The City,

205 (1924).

N. Y. 269, 120 N. E. 642 (1918).
Biddles v. Enright, 239 N. Y. 354, 146 N. E. 625 (1925).
,5Peo. ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 241 N. Y. 405, I5O N. E. 497 (1926).
3
Dunham v. Ottinger, 243 N. Y. 423 (1926); People v. Radio Corp. 244 N. Y.
34

224

3337(1926).
People v. Beakes Dairy Corp., 222 N. Y. 416, i9i N. E. 1I5 (1918).
38219 N. Y. 383, 386 114 N. E. 8o9 (1916).
39
Wulfsohn v. Russian Republic, 234 N. Y. 372, 138 N. E. 24 (3923).
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its existence ceased. Alive or dead no valid judgment might be
obtained against it.40
A different result was reached when the Soviet attempted to use
our courts. Now the question of recognition became material. If
recognized a foreign government may sue here. Not as of right,
however, but because of comity, andi where unrecognized, no such
41
comity exists. So a demurrer to the complaint was sustained.
Another class of cases deals with the results here of decrees of the
Soviet government, nationalizing property in Russia, confiscating
debts and terminating the life of corporations. These decrees have
been passed by a government having control of life and property
within its own borders. This is a fact, not a theory. Non-recognition
determines only what effect we shall give to them.
This much, I think is settled. A contract made by a citizen of
New York, to be performed in Russia, with an individual here
whether Russian or not, may be enforced in our courts. Neither the
fact that assets in Russia from which money would normally be paid,
have been seized; nor that the Russian government has assumed
liability; nor that it has attempted to confiscate the debt is a defense.4
It may be that at times decrees of non-recognized but de facto governments will be recognized by us, if consistent with our public policy
and our theories of equity and justice. But not so here. Suppose,
May it take
however, the promisor is a Russian corporation.
advantage of these decrees of its own government? May it claim
to be dead, that its obligations have been assumed by another who
under the decision in the Wulfsohn case 3 is immune from suit? The
answer was in the negative. "The defendant asks us to declare",
the court said, "its death as a means to the nullification of its debts
and the confiscation of its assets by the government of its domicile.
Neither the public policy of the nation ...nor any consideration of
equity or justice exacts an exception in such conditions to the need
of recognition.""4 As to the attempt of the Soviet to cancel the debts
of the nationalized corporations, even had there been recognition,
the decree would have had no extra-territorial effect.
Another situation may arise. A Russian corporation may be a
plaintiff. It may seek to recover a bank balance here. Shall the
court say that it is dead as the 0rnsk government was dead? That
40

Nanldvel v. Omsk All Russian Government, 237 N. Y. 15o, 142 N. E. 569

(1923).
4

'Russian Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N. Y. 255, 139 N. E. 259 (1923).
4Sokoloff
v. The Bank, 239 N. Y. 158, 145 N. E. 917 (1924).
43
Supra note 22.
44james v. Second Russian Ins. Co.,

239

N. Y. 248, 256, 146 N. E.369

(1925).
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any claim it may have is transferred to the Soviet? May a government do facto regulate its national corporations? May this be one of
the exceptions to which the court has referred? In no case has the
question yet been answered. In one, it was held that upon the testimony presented there was nothing to show any decree dissolving
the corporation. 4 Nor was the question decided in a second case,
where the plaintiff was defeated, but on the ground that if our courts
took jurisdiction their judgment might not protect the defendant
from the possibility of a double recovery. 46 In a still later case
brought by a corporation for similar relief, where the danger of a
double recovery was absent, it succeeded. 47 Here, however, there
was a finding of fact by which the court was bound, that the corporate existence continued.
The last case to be decided was brought by a Russian, who obtained
48
his policy in Russia against the New York Life Insurance Company.
Again, the effect of these decrees upon a Russian in Russia was not
considered.
Another line of cases deals with the rights of enemy aliens and the
effect of the war upon prior contracts made with them. In Techt v.
Hughes49 may be found a discussion as to their status, even though
they may reside here and be personally loyal to our government.
The same case speaks of treaties made with a nation with whom we
are subsequently at war, and the rule was laid down that "provisions
compatible with a state of hostilities, unless expressly terminated,
will be enforced, and those incompatible rejected." As to contracts,
the general rule was stated in Neumond v. Farmers Feed Company.50
"The effect of war upon an existing contract between belligerents will
vary with the nature of the obligation that is yet to be fulfilled.
If the contract has been fully executed by the enemy before the outbreak of hostilities, if all that is left is a unilateral obligation for
the payment of a debt the obligation is suspended. The citizen must
pay his debt when the war is at an end. On the other hand, if the
contract is still executory at the beginning of the war, if there are
mutual obligations that are yet to be fulfilled, the contract will be
terminated when the essential purpose of the parties would be
thwarted by delay or the business efficacy or value of their bargain
materially impaired."
45
6 joint

Stock Co. v. The Bank, 24o N. Y. 368, 148 N. E. 552 (1925).
4 Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 24o N. Y. 149, 147 N. E. 703 (1925).
47
8First Russian Ins. Co. v. Beha, 240 N. Y. 6oi, 148 N. E. 722 (1925).
' Sliosberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., Feb.
49229 N. Y. 222, 128 N. E. 185 (1920).
50244

N. Y. 202, 155 N. E. 1oo (1926).
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With the outbreak of the war and with the increasing probability
that we would become involved in the struggle, attempts were
made to transmit money to Europe. They gave rise to a number of
questions. The most important was as to the real nature of the
transaction where money is paid to a bank for the purpose of establishing in some foreign country a credit for the person paying. Does
the bank make a present sale of exchange? If so, certain serious
consequences follow. Or does it enter into an executory contract to
render certain services? In Equitable Trust Company v. Keene"
the reply to the question was limited by the form of the complaint
2
which the court considered. But in Gravenhorst v. Zimmerman
it was fairly presented. In that case, the money was paid to a New
York bank for "a wireless transfer" of marks to Berlin. The court
held that this was a contract for future action, not the sale of an
existing right. It was not like the purchase of a draft or bill of
exchange where one "obtains a written order by the drawer upon
the drawee which by commercial usage and even by statutory enactment in some jurisdictions has come to be recognized as the symbol
and equivalent of money, and which enables one who has obtained it
without further action by the drawer to obtain from the drawee
the moneys which it represents." The banker may have no existing
foreign credit. That he simply agrees to create. Nor does any
trust relationship exist between the banker and his customer.3 Doubtless the court in reaching this decision on a controverted point was
influenced by what it believed to be the ordinary usage and understanding of business men.
A somewhat more doubtful case was Richard v. American Union
Bank.M The defendant agreed to establish in Roumania a credit
for the plaintiff of 2,000,000 lei at a fixed date. It failed to do so,
but later did establish such a credit. The plaintiff did not rescind
the contract. Instead, he drew the lei deposited to his account and
sued to recover damages alleging that the "market value" of the lei
had declined since the date when the deposit should have been made.
The contract was without question an executory one to be performed
at Bucharest. Damages for its breach were to be measured there and
by the standards of value there prevailing. As damages for a delay
in establishing a credit here might not include anything for a smaller
purchasing power of our dollar, so damages for establishing a credit
N. Y. 290, 133 N. E. 894 (1922).
52236 N. Y. 22, 139 N. E. 766 (1923).
53Legniti v. The Bank, 23o N. Y. 415, I3o N. E. 597
6241 N. Y. 163, 149 N. E. 338 (1925).
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of leis in Roumania, measured there, might not include the diminished purchasing power of the lei.
One more reference to banking matters-although this time
having no relation to war conditions. Concededly, where a bank
issues an irrevocable letter of credit for the benefit of the seller of
goods, it assumes no duty which requires it to investigate the quality
of the merchandise. It may make payment upon the presentation of
the specified documents. If, however, the papers presented are
proper in form, may it refuse payment because it has in fact investigated and found the goods of inferior quality? The court said it
might not. That was a question between buyer and seller. If the
letter of credit was in the usual form, if no such right was reserved
therein, the contract of the bank was to pay on the presentation
of the documents. Its duty was absolute.55 Again, the court followed
what it believed to be ordinary commercial usage.
Several recent cases have to do with marriage. Whatever the
agreements between the parties as to their future relations prior to a
civil ceremony, the law will not recognize an understanding to refrain
from cohabitation until a religious ceremony is performed. The refusal to consent to ordinary matrimonial relations amounts to a desertion
or abandonment. An agreement to refuse them modifies the fnarriage
contract. However conscientious the motives for such an agreement,
it will not be tolerated. Our legislature has fixed the status of this
contract as a civil one, carrying with it certain rights, duties and
obligations. It may not be altered by private agreement. To permit
this would violate the public policy of the State56
Of interest, too, are some recent decisions in regard to foreign
divorce. In Ball v. Cross,57 a husband obtained in Nevada a decree of
divorce against his wife whom he had married in Missouri, on the
ground of cruelty. There was no matrimonial domicile in Nevada.
The last such domicile was in Texas. The summons was served by
publication and the wife neither appeared nor answered. Was the
divorce valid as to her? Had she been a citizen of, and domiciled in
New York our courts would have ignored the decree. She was,
however, a citizen of Texas. If the law of Texas held the divorce
valid, then it is not for us to declare it void. If she is freed from her
matrimonial obligations in the state of her domicile, she is freed
elsewhere. So we should refer to the rule there in deciding whether
her later marriage to a citizen of New York was good or bad. In
15650'Meara Co. v. The Bank, 239 N. Y. 386, 146 N. E. 636
Mirizio v. Mirizio, 242 N. Y. 74, 55o N. E. 6o5 (1926).
r723I N. Y. 329, 132 N. E. io6 (1921).
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Dean v. Dean,58 on the same theory the court followed the Canadian
practice in refusing to recognize such a divorce obtained against a
Canadian subject when she sued here.
In Hubbard v. Hubbard,9 the wife, separated from her former
husband whom she had married in Pennsylvania, and then domiciled
in Massachusetts, had obtained a divorce against him in that state,
upon service by publication and without his appearance. That
husband was then a resident of New York, dying there in i912.
After the divorce, she married Mr. Hubbard also domiciled in Massachusetts. The marriage was there valid. Later they both moved to
this state, and here, after the death of the former husband, Mr.
Hubbard, sought to annul his marriage on the ground that 'the
divorce was invalid. The court held that whatever the former
husband might do, Mr. Hubbard might not complain. His marriage
was perfectly valid where contracted. We would not act as we
might have done if the former husband, who had become a citizen of
New York at the time of the divorce, had moved in the matter. Our
policy "does not Tequire the establishment of this state as a forum of
refuge to which parties to a marriage, validly consummated in a
sister state in which they were domiciled may, they having become
residentg of this state, resort to have the marriage adjudged a nullity."
In Gould v. Gould,"0 while husband and wife were married in Scotland, the husband and consequently the wife were domiciled in New
York. They had lived for years, however, in Paris. There the wife
committed adultery. In an action begun in the French courts by
the husband in which jurisdiction was obtained of the wife, a decree
in his favor was granted. The Court of Appeals held that while we
need not, we should, under the circumstances, recognize that decree
here. To do so would not offend our public policy. But the opinion
contained this caution, "If in the instant case the judgments of the
courts of France disclosed that the parties were merely sojourning
in France at the time the decree of divorce was granted, or that a
residence in France was of such limited duration as to lead the
Supreme Court to believe that the decree was the result of collusion,
or the judgment not rendered for a cause recognized as sufficient
cause for absolute divorce by the law of this state, it may be that
the justice presiding would be justified in holding that the decree was
contrary to the policy of this state and in refusal to give effect" to it.
5824I N. Y. 240, 149 N. E. 844 (1925).
59228 N. Y. 81, 87, 126 N. E. 5o8 (1920).
60235 N. Y. 14, 29, 138 N. E. 490 (1922).
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Those obtaining divorces in Paris, of whom we hear so much today,
should heed this warning.
The question of the effect to be given to the French judgment was,
therefore, finally disposed of in the exercise of discretion. The court
once more reviewed the matter of foreign judgments in Johnston v.
Compagnie Generale Transatantique,61 referring here, however, to
judgments purely in personam. As to them it refused to follow
the United States rule.
In matters of evidence, there are but two decisions that need
detain us. A police officer, with no show of right, by unreasonable
search procures some articles tending to show the criminality of
another. Such articles are subsequently offered in evidence against
the owner on his trial for crime. The Supreme Court of the United
States have held that they should be rejected. To the contrary our
courts hold that they should be received. The reasoning in support
of the New York rule is stated in an able opinion of Chief Judge
Cardozo.'
In some of the earlier cases, the court was supposed to have laid
down a special rule of evidence in respect to alleged oral contracts
made with one deceased, often for the support of a child, or for payment of services rendered by a surviving friend or relative. Reference
to these cases are still found in briefs as authority for the proposition
that contracts of this kind must be proved by disinterested witnesses
and established by clear and convincing testimony. Such is not
the law. In civil cases, the plaintiff need produce but a preponderance of evidence.
In determining whether he has done so, the
triers of facts may and should remember that death prevents speech
by the alleged promisor. So they may reject evidence they would
accept if he were alive to contradict. They may consider the possibility of disproof. But all this is a counsel of caution to them, not a
matter of law on appeal."
This rule has several times been reiterated.4
In contracts, perhaps as important a case as any during the last
ten years is Woods v. Duff-Gordon65 where there was used the classical
phrase "instinct with an obligation." In a certain contract an
express promise by one party may be lacking, yet when the agreement
is viewed as a whole, it may be seen to be meaningless unless such a
N. Y. 381, 152 N. E. 121 (1926).
People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 15o N. E. 585 (1926).
6McKeon v. Van Slyck, 223 N. Y. 392, II9 N. E. 85I (I918).
"Ward v. Insurance Co., 225 N. Y. 314, 122 N. E. 207 (1919); Matter of
Sherman, 227 N. Y. 350, 125 N. E. 546 (i919); Caldwell v. Lucas, 233 N. Y.
248,135
N. E.8321 (922).
61222 N. Y.
61242
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promise is implied. The grant to him of certain rights, requires
the assumption by him of correlative duties. The courts will interpret such contracts as business men would ordinarily understand
them and they would understand the contract as intended to have
business efficacy.
The extent and application of the rule in Lawrence v. Fox"6 has
been before the court on several occasions. Probably it is not fully
settled. In Seaver v. Ransom,17 the court said that the recovery by a
third party for promises made for his benefit is at present confined to
four classes of cases: (i) where there is a pecuniary obligation running
from the promisee to the beneficiary; (2) where the contract is made
for the benefit of a wife, affianced wife, or child of a party to the
contract; (3) in public contract cases, and (4) where, at the request
of a party to the contract, the promise runs directly to the beneficiary.
But the second rule was here extended to cover the case of a dependent niece, the court quoting with approval the statement of
the Appellate Division: "The doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox is progressive, not retrogressive. The course of late decisions is to enlarge,
not limit the effect of that case." How far, under different circumstances the court may extend the rule it is difficult to say. It may
finally adopt the general doctrine that any third person, for whose
benefit a contract was intended can sue on it. Perhaps that way
justice and common sense lie.
I need not refer in detail to the course of the court in rationalizing
the rule as to the need of mutuality in obtaining a decree for the
specific performance of a contract. In Waddle v. Cabana8 it was
pointed out that the particular contract in question was mutual in
its obligation and remedy. But in Epstein v. Gluckin69 it was distinctly held that "what equity exacts today as a condition of relief
is the assurance that the decree, if rendered, will operate without
injustice or oppression either to plaintiff or to defendant. Mutuality
of remedy is important in so far only. as its presence is essential
to the attainment of that end."
There are other decisions on the law of contracts which I might
discuss had I the time. Policies of insurance, their provisions with
the rules as to waiver;70 sales of food and the warranties and obliN. Y. 268 (1859).
N. Y. 233, 12o N. B. 639 (1918).
N. Y. 18, 114 N. E. 1054 (1917).
N. Y. 490, 494, 135 N. E. 861 (1922).
McCormack v. Ins. Co., 220 N. Y. 447, 116 N. E. 74 (1917); Greentaner v.

"2o

67224
68220
69233
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Ins. Co., 228 N. Y. 388, 127 N. E. 249 (1920); Satz v. Bonding Co., 243 N. Y.
385 (1926); Kwiatowsld v. Brotherhood, 243 N. Y. 394 (1926).
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gations in connection therewith;71 the responsibility of a municipality
for the quality of the water furnished by it to consumers; 72 where
on a sale a mistake is made as to the identity of the buyer; 73 damages
arising from a breach of a contract to sell; 74 the rule as to deliveries
and the effect of an extension of time;7 5 public contracts with their
references to plans and specifications;76 matters relating to the election
of remedies;77 are all subjects of interest to the lawyer and judge but
may not be dealt with here. There are, too, many cases dealing
with the new arbitration law, intended fairly to carry out its purposes
and to promote the requirements of business in a great commercial
center. There are also discussions as to when a foreign corporation
is doing business within the state so that it may be here sued or
taxed. Many of these cases may not be new departures. They may'
not involve new rules or new theories. They do indicate, I think, a
liberal outlook, a desire, while preserving what is best in the past,
still to regard the needs of the present.
Let us turn to other subjects. As to wills, less and less heed is
given to technical rules of construction. More and more the effort is
to discover the real intent of the testator, and, where found, if
8
possible to effectuate itJ

In regard to real property, one of the most important decisions
related to the title to the beds of the great lakes in the western part
of the state lying east of the Massachusetts Cession line and not on
any state boundary. As to those west of that line different considerations are applicable. Where the State by patent conveys a lot
according to a certain map, which map shows the lot running to the
shores of one of these greater lakes, does the patentee take title
to the center, as he would under like circumstances in case of a
pond or in case of such a navigable stream as the Oswego River?
Very probably not, the court said. It was not essential, however,
to determine the question for if the abutter under such circumstances
held title to the line of low water reached in the ordinary dry season,
the result was decisive of the issues presented. That he did was held
7

Rinaldi v. Mohican Co., 225 N. Y. 70, 121 N. E. 471 (1919).
n2Canavan v. The City, 229 N. Y. 473, 128 N. E. 882 (1920).
7Phelps
v. McQuade, 22o N. Y. 232, 115 N. E. 44I (97).
74
0rester v. Rubber Co., 228 N. Y. 134, 126 N. E. 5IO (1920).
5

7 Trainor v. Amsinck, 236 N. Y. 392, 14o N. E. 931 (1923); Murray v. Ledgerwood
76 Co., 241 N. Y. 455, I5O N. E. 514 (1925).
Faver v. The City, 222 N. Y. 255, 118 N. E. 6o9 (1918); Leary v. The City,
222 N. Y. 337, 18 N. E. 249 (1918); Matter of Semper, 227 N. Y. 151, 124 N. E.
743 (i9i9); Foundation Co. v. The State, 233 N. Y. 177, 135 N. E. 236 (1922).
7.Schenck v. Telephone CO., 238 N. Y. 308, 144 N. E. 592 (1924).
78Matter of Bump, 234 N. Y. 60, 136 N. E. 295 (1922); Ins. Co. v. Winthrop,
237 N. Y. 93, 142 N. E. 431 (1924); Matter of Neil, 238 N. Y. 138, 1~ N. E. 481
(1924); Matter of Trevor, 2.39 N. Y. 6, 145 N. E. 66 (1924).
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by the court in a close decision. The questions as to whether the
public in times of high water had not the right of navigation where a
boat may float, or whether "low water mark" means the mark to
which the water may sink in extraordinary seasons or simply its
7 9
ordinary and usual low level, were expressly reserved.
As has been suggested in regard to torts, the court has somewhat
greater freedom as to innovation. Harry C. Fisher was the originator
of so-called "comic" strips which have become known under the name
of "Mutt and Jeff." Most of you probably have seen them. Because
of them the author earned a very large income. But his rights were
protected by no copyright. The court held that to copy these
grotesque figures and to use the names "Mutt and Jeff" placing them
in new situations and with new letter-press attached was unfair
competition. It would lead the public to believe that it was buying
the cartoons of Fisher. The words and figures had obtained a secondary meaning, to the effect that he had originated them and that his
"genius" pervades all that they appear to do and say. Having
originated the figures and names he had acquired a property right in
them which should be protected.80 This opinion was the last prepared before his death by Judge Chase, for so many years a faithful
and able member of the Court of Appeals, a man whom all remember
with admiration and respect.
A traveller on his way to New York dies on a steamship. His
body is embalmed and could have been carried into port without risk
or trouble. Within twenty hours of land, however, it is cast into
the sea, although his effects showed the name and address of a son
and contained money much in excess of the cost of sending him a
notification. The son was held to be entitled to damages for mental
distress and anguish caused by this act. The court based its decision
largely upon certain common law rules relating to the disposal of
the dead admitting that their application to the case at bar was
novel.81
A springboard annexed to a railroad's land extends out over the
Harlem River. It was a fixture, a permanent improvement of its
right of way. One standing on the board over the water and beyond
the line of the railroad property is killed because of the negligent
maintenance by the railroad of one of its electric wires. If the springboard affixed to the land is part of the real estate of the railroad, then
the injured party is a trespasser and may not recover. If being
7"Stewart v. Turney, 237 N. Y. 117, 142 N. E. 437
8
8

(1924).

Fisher v. Star Company, 231 N. Y. 414, 132 N. E. 133 (1928).
Finlay v. Atlantic Transport Co., 220 N. Y. 249, i5 N. E. 715 (1917).
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above the river, a public highway, he was rightfully there, he may
recover. Which alternative was the court to choose? It did choose
the more liberal one,81 although with so strong a dissent as to show
that the choice was far from inevitable. A like liberal view was
taken in an earlier case where at night responding to an alarm a
fieman enters a private alley used to deliver goods to the premises
and falls into an unlighted and unguarded hole." Was he a trespasser or licensee so that no affirmative care was due him? Clearly
he was not a trespasser. But was he there by the implied invitation
of the owner? The court, against the weight of authority in this
country, thought that he was. In any event, he was more than a
bare licensee. He entered the property as of right, over a way
prepared as a means of access for those entitled to enter.
In England, it is held that there is no duty to use any care whatever
in making oral statements in the way of business or otherwise, on
which other persons are likely to act.8 A contrary rule was foreshadowed here,"' but now it has been decided that the relations
between the parties may be such as to make one liable for a negligent
reply to the enquiry of another.8"
Does malice ever make an act otherwise lawful, unlawful? If the
motive is unjustifiable, if the only purpose is to injure another,
is the act wrongful? The tendency seems to be to hold that it is
although this may be doubtful.87 But at least this is true. Where
one has a contract with another, a third party having knowledge
of such contract may not induce him to break it intentionally and
without reasonable justification. 8
Other matters have been discussed. The duty of a railroad to an
intoxicated passenger; 89 of a sleeping car company as to the property
of passengers; 9" damages in libel actions, 91 and in. actions against
innkeepers;"2 statutes and ordinances and whether they give a cause
of action against an individual;93 the rule of respondeat superior as
82

Hynes v. R. R., 231 N. Y. 229, 131 N. E. 898 (1921).
TMeiers v. Koch Brewery, 229 N. Y. 10, 127 N. E. 491 (1920).
8Fish v. Kilby, 17 C. B. (N. S.) 194 (1864).
=Bush Terminal Co. v. Ins. Co., 228 N. Y. 575, 127 N. E. 909 (1920); Glanzer
v. 86
Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. B. 275 (1922).
87International Products Co. v. R. R., 244 N. Y. 331 (927).
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v. Kilmer, 236 N. Y. 80, 84o N. E. 203 (1923).
Lamb v. Cheney, 227 N. Y. 418, 125 N. E. 817 (8989); Campbell v. Gates,
23689 N. Y. 457, 141 N. E. 914 (1923).
Fagan v. R. R. 220 N. Y. 3oI, 15 N. E. 704 (1917).
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N. Y. 549, 116 N. E. 376 (1917).

ODen Norske v. The Sun, 226 N. Y. 1, 122 N. B. 463 (8919).
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v. The Hotel, 228 N. Y. 806, 126 N. B. 647 (1920).
93Karpeles v. Heine, 227 N. Y. 74, 124 N. E. IOI (8989); Martin v. Herzog,
228 N. Y. 164, 126 N. E. 884 (920); Ward v. R. R., 230 N. Y. 230, 829 N. B.
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applied to hospitals;94 and as to proximate cause;9 5 again not all
showing changes in existing rules, but indicating where changes may
be expected.
And so I end as I began. Changes come. Whether all or some or
none result in progress, in greater justice on the whole, only the
future may decide. But whether or no, change is inevitable. New
needs must be recognized. I repeat, however, that I speak but for
myself. If cases have been misinterpreted or the purposes of the court
misunderstood, mine alone is the fault. To me, however, it is certain,
viewing these decisions, that the tendency of the Court of Appeals in
recent years has been toward greater liberality. There has been less
regard to mere technicalities either of substance or procedure. There
has been a desire to make the law require fair dealing and honesty
and equity. At the same time, there has been restraint. There has
been refusal to write new rules just because of logical consistency.
The thought may be, in the middle path lies safety.
4Philips v. The Hospital, 239 N. Y. 188, 146 N. E. 1g9 (1924).
Donelly v. Contracting Co., 222 N. Y. 210, 118 N. E. 605 (1918); Bird v.
Ins. Co., 224 N. Y. 47, 12o N. E. 86 (1918).
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